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COMMENTS ON D/PUB DRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR OPC CONTACTS:

1. Re III.B. - The "substantive contributions" to be made by ORE (referred to in the second sentence) presumably might take the form of additional data or of interpretation, conclusions, etc.

2. Re III.C. - On the other hand, ORE has taken the position, and rightly so, that OPC should look to ORE for intelligence estimates and interpretations. Consequently, ORE should insure that all legitimate OPC requests are undertaken by ORE components to avoid the necessity (from OPC's standpoint) of seeking its intelligence support elsewhere.

3. The draft Operating Procedure covers specific contacts. There is also in operation (in D/FE at any rate) a system of recurring contacts under which OPC representatives make daily visits to at least one Area Branch to read daily cable traffic. Presumably, in the case of each similar contact within ORE, necessary arrangements have been worked out which permit OPC representatives to obtain oral briefings or to make notes on the information contained in daily cable traffic. It would be most natural for OPC representatives making recurrent visits to use such contacts to secure other oral or written information (in the absence of very specific instructions to the contrary) without the specific cognizance of either the ORE's control (D/Pub) or the Regional Division's control (the Division Chief or his designate). If it is the object of ORE to maintain a strict control of information passed to OPC then the procedures need to provide for it and, further, should provide for imposition by the Regional Divisions of uniformly strict internal controls. There would be no point from the standpoint of overall ORE interests to have in operation a strict control system in one component of ORE if it were not matched by equally strict controls in all the

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other components. As now cast, the ORE procedures seem to leave room for widely varied interpretation.

J. [unclear]
8 March 50

Notes on Draft Operating Procedure - OPC Contacts

General

The proposed procedures appear to be too flexible and not sufficiently encompassing.

III Support

Question the validity of either D/Pub or the Division concerned reflecting any OPC request without AD, ORE approval. The apparent reasonableness of the request (A), the nature of the request, (B), and the capabilities of the producing Division, (C), are factors which may have to be worked out with OPC, but rejection should be resorted to only as the last resort.

III A.

The reasonableness of the request should be determined by OPC by careful screening of individual requests before they are presented to ORE.

III B.

Believe ORE should provide OPC with info on where the desired info is available, if it already is. (we do)

III C.

Believe OPC should ~~come~~ ^{COME} only to ORE for support. If ORE cannot provide the required support itself, it should accept responsibility for obtaining it externally through OCD. This is all taken care of elsewhere. — OPC must try ORE before going elsewhere.

IV A 6. This meeting should be arranged through the Division Chief - to keep him informed

IV B 2. The contact should be made through the Div. Chief.

ORE Operating Procedure

TO No 1. suggest adding "in the understanding that all OPC requirements for evaluated intelligence support will be submitted to ORE". 25X1A

TO No 2. suggest covering the point brought up in #3 of [REDACTED] comments.

TO No 4. suggest adding ORE's responsibility to obtain info externally, if necessary.

TO No 5. suggest inserting guidance to Divisions when visited by OPC personnel without prior clearance in D/Pub

25X1A
[REDACTED]

In general, it is an authority properly delegated could not be a continued burden on A/ORE.

Varies with Division

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*There are rough notes
prepared by Capt. Watts and
myself for whatever value
they may have to you personally.
Thank you very much for the
"look-see"*

John

13 Mar 50

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OPC and all that

Much work needs to be cleared before discussing procedure for handling OPC requests. Hits at heart of whole production priority question.

1. In disposing of priority question, following assumptions must be made:

a. The CIA Daily, Weekly and Monthly Summaries must be produced regardless of any other work loads

b. Requests from NSC (and White House) must be given highest priority after these periodicals

c. Legitimate requests from Sec. Def., Joint Chiefs and Sec State, must be honored, probably with a priority rating in the order listed

d. Next on list come requests from AD/CIA. These cannot be turned down.

e. Support for the NIS program - unavoidable, but does not carry a high time priority

2. Beyond these responsibilities, first emphasis must be placed on the fulfillment of CIA's assigned function -- namely, the production of national intelligence estimates. In other words, the ORE series. It has become apparent during the past few years that ORE has experienced great difficulty in producing timely and significant ORE's. Aside from the limiting factor of too few people in ORE capable of writing a good estimate, the obstacle most often cited is that of pressure of other business. A fundamental problem, therefore, is to find means of decreasing the workload of existing personnel so as to free them for more energetic concentration on the fulfillment of CIA's principle ~~function~~ function -- the production of national intelligence estimates.

3. The filling of OPC requests does not fall in the category of national

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intelligence production. It must therefore vie in the allocation of Division work loads with such projects or duties as: filling requests for SO and OO₂ and for such comparatively low-level types as Norburg, producing Division Monthlies and staff studies, briefing outgoing military and foreign service personnel, evaluating SO and State material, and even with the Division Weeklies in so far as the material included in them is designed primarily for opposite number rather than top-level policy and operational consumption.

4. Conclusions possible at this stage:

a. Under no circumstances are OPC requests to be given a priority over the production outlined in Paragraph 1, with the possible exception of le. (NIS)

b. The filling of OPC requests at the expense of the production of national intelligence (ORE's) should not be condoned unless one of the following high level policy decisions is made:

i. the production of national intelligence is relegated to a position of secondary importance

ii. the divisions are given sufficient personnel to be able to produce the necessary national intelligence as well as to meet OPC's requirements.

c. Whatever mechanical procedure is devised for dealing with OPC requests, must be based on the two general principles stated in paras a and b above.

5. It is probably unnecessary to discuss now two alternative means of reducing work loads in the Divisions -- namely

a. Creation of an estimates group, or

b. Creation of a research unit which could handle the factual type of request usually submitted by OPC.

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